It is often claimed that pollution reductions can be achieved at lower cost in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, because more possibilities exist to update production processes and reduce waste. To date, however, there has been little or no systematic evaluation of what the costs actually are in these countries. The main purpose of this paper is to partially fill this research gap using firm-level data from Lithuania. Abatement cost estimates for key air pollutants are presented based on investments made in Lithuania during 1993-94. The paper also attempts to estimate the demand for pollution directly using data on pollution charges from 1994. Lithuania offers a relatively unique opportunity to conduct such an analysis, because the system of pollution charges sets different rates for different polluters emitting the same pollutant. Using both methods it is shown that for at least some key pollutants marginal and average abatement costs are probably substantially lower in Lithuania than in western countries.
INTRODUCTION
Following the opening of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the former Soviet Union (FSU) to outside examination, at least among those involved with environmental policy development an oft debated issue has been whether reducing emissions of key pollutants can really be done at low or no cost. Often such questions have been phrased in terms of whether costs are lower than in the west.
1 Perhaps this issue was first raised by Hughes (1993) , but it has also been echoed in the policy literature (e.g. Environment for Europe, 1994, II-5) , as well as implied in the regional pollution prevention literature (e.g. Dobes, 1995; World Environment Center 1995a; 1995b) . The idea behind such claims is that production technologies in CEE and the FSU are substantially less efficient than in the west and therefore have higher emissions per unit of output. Large environmental gains can therefore be had by focusing on changes in production processes that reduce waste, produce better products or both.
2 Indeed, the story goes, end-ofpipe controls in many cases can be left for the future because these gains are likely to be so large.
To date, however, there has been little or no systematic evaluation of what the costs actually are in CEE and FSU countries. The main purpose of this paper is to partially fill this research gap using firmlevel data from Lithuania. Abatement cost estimates for key air pollutants are presented based on investments made in Lithuania during 1993-94. The paper also attempts to estimate the demand for pollution directly using data on pollution charges from 1994. Lithuania offers a relatively unique opportunity to conduct such an analysis, because the system of pollution charges sets different rates for different polluters emitting the same pollutant. Using both methods it is shown that for at least some key pollutants marginal and average abatement costs are probably substantially lower in Lithuania than in western countries.
This question is not only interesting in its own right, but knowing costs of abatement is also very important for policy making. Perhaps the most important application is for setting pollution charge rates to achieve particular goals. As discussed in Farrow and Vincent (forthcoming, 1997) , most countries in the CEE and FSU have made pollution charges important and even key parts of their environmental policy systems. 3 The question of calibration of charges is therefore a major one. Nevertheless, it is difficult to find even one careful study of the demand for pollution in any country in the region, and rates are normally set on purely political grounds. Despite this lack of analysis, it has often been observed that rates are "too low" in the region. Rarely, however, has the question of "too low to achieve what?" that is so closely linked with the need for abatement cost estimation been effectively answered.
A relatively new reason why abatement cost estimation is useful for policy making is related to the goal of integration with the European Union. Many CEE countries are in the process of approximating their legislation to that of the EU and it is likely that substantial and even fundamental changes will be required at the plant level as a result of this process. It is expected that investments necessary to 1 The term "west" is meant to refer to countries of the European Union, European Economic Area, United States and Canada. In particular, the term does not imply any divide between western, eastern and central Europe. Indeed, most countries in Central and Eastern Europe are actively seeking membership in the European Union. 2 Typically such measures are referred to as "win-win," because emissions are reduced at the same time companies make changes that are either profitable from the start or pay back very quickly. 3 In this paper a pollution charge is defined as a charge levied on the actual or reported emissions (in tons per year) of a particular pollutant. Extensive discussions of the implementation of pollution charge systems in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union can be found in Controlling Pollution in Transition Economies: Theories and Methods, Randall Bluffstone and Bruce A. Larson, Editors, Forthcoming, 1997, Edward Elgar Publishing Co. approximate will be very expensive and several studies are currently underway to estimate these costs. 4 To date, however, no baseline cost estimates have been established from which one might judge the significance of such changes. What costs are truly attributable to EU integration and what should be considered normal within the current regulatory system is therefore likely to remain a mystery.
The paucity of abatement cost studies in the region is not surprising, because estimating the demand for pollution based on observed behavior is certainly less than straightforward. Indeed, marginal abatement cost functions are ideally firm-specific. In reality, however, except for a few industries with well-known technologies, constructing even a partial set of firm-specific abatement cost functions is difficult or impossible. Economy-wide abatement cost functions made up of single points on individual firms' abatement cost curves are therefore the best one can realistically expect. Achieving even this simpler goal has proved difficult, however, at least partly because abatement measures are quite difficult to define.
The perhaps standard approach is that abatement costs are defined and estimated using engineering models that restrict the set of abatement options to end-of-pipe controls. When it is possible to test such models, however, it is often found they have overstated costs. For example, at the time of development of a pollution charge on NO x emissions introduced in Sweden in 1992, average abatement costs were estimated at SEK 40 (approximately $5.50) per kilogram. The actual cost turned out to be less than one-quarter of that figure, resulting in substantial over-compliance (Swedish Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, 1994) . Similarly, revenues from a sulfur charge introduced in Sweden in 1991 yielded revenues only half the predicted level, again suggesting abatement costs were over-estimated (Nystrom, 1996) . In the European countries in transition, estimates of SO 2 abatement costs in Poland have been proposed (again, based on engineering models) that are several times higher than those estimated for the US (Berbeka, 1995) .
A very general definition of abatement measures that includes more than end-of-pipe controls is certainly needed in the CEE and FSU if one believes that most "environmental" investments are not endof-pipe measures at all, but instead are integral parts of enterprise restructuring (Sachs, 1995) . If environmental change is linked to the essentials of economic change, it also means that a wide variety of abatement options must exist in the economy. Such variation in abatement costs, of course, makes economic instruments like pollution charges attractive, but it also means that identifying an "environmental" investment is difficult. With environmental costs potentially so wrapped up in basic business changes, firms themselves -even assuming they are able to identify and assign costs to measures they have taken -probably will not know the environmental effects their actions have induced.
Even if least-cost abatement methods are clear, simple calculations of costs are still likely to be problematic, because often measures affect more than one pollutant simultaneously. For example, regulators may define a project as affecting SO 2 , but in reality other pollutants are also significantly reduced. With joint costs, assigning costs to particular pollutants becomes somewhat tricky. These issues of definition and joint costs have to some extent been recognized and addressed in the literature. With World Bank support, for example, significant empirical work has been conducted both in the US and in developing countries. Using the US Commerce Department Pollution Abatement Cost and Expenditures (PACE) survey, Hartman et al (1994) estimated costs of air pollution reductions based on observed variation in emissions, firm characteristics and the level of investments in control equipment. Key results are presented in Table 1 . Dasgupta et al (1996) also estimated marginal costs of reducing water pollutants in China, and found they are surprisingly low, as low as a few cents per ton for BOD, COD and suspended solids. The burgeoning literature on the effects of environmental regulation on productivity takes the approach even further by completely avoiding the problem of defining pollution abatement costs (e.g. Barbera and McConnell, 1986; Gray, 1987; Gray and Shadbegian, 1995; Jaffe et al, 1995 Lithuania, which is the setting for this study, became independent from the Soviet Union in 1990. Economic transformation has been underway since independence and indeed by 1996 the economy had been transformed from one based on agriculture, mining and manufacturing to one with a substantial service sector.
7 A consequence of this transformation has been a sharp decline in industrial output. Many industrial firms are reported to be operating on the verge of bankruptcy, and a substantial percentage of manufacturing firms are known to be producing at only a fraction of pre-1989 levels. In 1994, for example, 75% of the enterprises analyzed in this paper were producing at least 30% below and 50% were at less than half of pre-independence levels.
8 These economic changes have certainly been good for the environment. Air quality has substantially improved in the country since independence and the introduction of market reforms. Emissions of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, carbon monoxide and dust all fell by at least two-thirds between 1989 and 1996 (Ministry of Environmental Protection, 1997).
Environmental protection is the responsibility of the Ministry of Environmental Protection and environmental inspectors who are the primary agents of the Ministry's fifty-five regional departments. The environmental regulatory system in Lithuania, as in most CEE and FSU countries, combines facility-level 5 It should be noted that these results are not useful for setting pollution charge rates, because they are expressed in terms of productivity units and costs are not attributable to particular pollutants. Indeed, I am not aware of any study that derived cost curves for particular pollutants with heterogeneous industries that even remotely resembled the marginal abatement cost functions found in most textbooks. 6 Hartman et al (1994) present estimates in 1979 dollars. The estimates in Table 1 assume an annual inflation rate of 3. 0% between 1979 and 1995. 7 An important part of this increase in services is banking, but capital markets are still extremely thin in Lithuania and virtually all environmental investment capital is internally generated. As was noted by Fischer et al (1996) Lithuanian GDP fell by 61% during the period 1989 -1994, a decline that occurred even as most of the economy was privatized. As of 1996, only 25% of firms were under state control (Gray, 1996) . In the sample of firms examined in this paper, the average percentage of stock owned by the state was 20.1%. The median was substantially lower at 8.0%. permits and pollution charges levied on reported emissions monitored through periodic spot-checks. 9 The most important section of a permit is an annual facility standard that specifies a facility's target emissions of each permitted pollutant. Good environmental performance is defined as emitting at or below this standard, which is abbreviated as DLT. These facility level standards are set in the case of air pollution to divide up a total air pollution load among all enterprises in a region such that ambient air quality goals are met.
10 It should be emphasized that if these standards are violated no legal breach occurs. Indeed, the only implication of over-standard pollution is that substantially higher charge rates are applied. Firms who are judged to have no hope of meeting their DLT standards can apply for more lenient LLT standards if they also agree to carry out plans to achieve DLT standards within agreed periods of time. For criteria air pollutants, approximately one-third of all polluters have LLT standards (Semënienë et al, forthcoming) .
DLT and LLT standards are tailor-made for each facility. They are set not only based on estimated environmental effects, but are also adjusted for differing sizes of facilities, types of products, vintages and types of production technologies used, and qualities of existing end-of-pipe controls. They therefore encapsulate a large amount of technical information into one number. The pollution charge rate structure that is linked to these standards is quite complicated. There are a total of 151 base rates defined for different pollutants, but the charge rates owed depend on the type of standard and the ratio of a facility's emissions to that standard. Because different polluters are assigned different standards, this rate structure means that different polluters pay different rates for emissions of the same pollutants,. One way to think about these functions specified in the regulations is that they show the willingness of the State to supply the assimilative capacity of the environment.
As Table 2 suggests, charge rates for key pollutants are quite low. For example, Lithuanian charge rates for sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide and dust were only 15% -25% of those levied in Poland (Anderson and Fiedor, forthcoming) . 11 The charge in Sweden that is applied to nitrogen oxide emissions by power plants is over 500 times that found in Lithuania. Also as shown in Table 2 , the annual charges paid by firms are generally low. Only one reason is low charge rates, however, because the distribution of emissions is also highly skewed, with many small and relatively few medium and large polluters.
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But as shown in Table 3 , just because a firm is supposed to pay a particular rate does not mean it actually pays it. It is well-known that in practice there is a certain lack of formalism in enforcement. One example of this tendency is that charge rates paid often deviate from those specified in the law. Both over and under-charging was typical for facilities with both types of standards emitting below, at or above standards. Perhaps not surprisingly, however, over-charging often occurred when facilities were entitled to rates that were low or zero.
13 Conversely, those who were required to pay high rates often did not pay them. In both cases there was a tendency for firms to pay rates equal or very close to base rates. 9 In the sample used in this paper, air polluters are checked on average every 6.3 months. 10 This mapping of enterprise emissions into ambient concentrations is done using dispersion models. As of 1996, ambient standards had been developed for approximately 800 pollutants. Of these, 151 substances had pollution charge rates. Semënienë et al (forthcoming) provide a discussion of the details of the system in Lithuania. 11 It should be noted that a real doubling of charge rates occurred on July 1, 1995 when full inflation indexing was adopted. 12 Such a skewed distribution makes the median a much better measure of central tendency. A "normal" firm therefore typically pays very low charges. 13 When asked if they knew they were paying higher charges, many firms' managers said they did know it. When asked why they paid higher charges than were required by law, a common response was that it was simply not worth antagonizing environmental inspectors. With a system in which central controls on regional behavior are relatively weak, relations between inspectors and polluters are often long-term and sometimes also close, with a rate structure that is complicated and time-consuming to check, it is perhaps not surprising there is room for negotiating charge rates that both regulator and regulated regard as "fair." One possible way to interpret this behavior is that such "too-low" or "too-high" charge rates are viewed as unfair in Lithuania, resulting in a system that is somewhat analogous to that of a market in which price negotiation is allowed to occur. 
THE DATA, SOME PRELIMINARY RESULTS AND ECONOMETRIC ISSUES
The air pollutants examined in this paper are sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, carbon monoxide, manganese and dust. 15 Data are cross-sectional and come from a 366-enterprise random sample of all 14 Mean and median charge rates are similar. 15 In the Lithuanian system, six categories of dust are charged. The main category is called organic and inorganic dust. Figure 1 presents annualized marginal abatement costs for dust emission reductions from this survey. Dust is a case where the problem of joint costs is relatively small and respondents to the survey were able to provide estimates of pollution reductions achieved. These figures are actually net annualized abatement costs, because in several cases resources were saved as a result of the investments and these savings were netted out from costs. 17 The results are ordered from the lowest to highest annual cost, with reductions expressed as a percentage of the total emissions reduction that would occur if all projects were undertaken. As expected, there is a very large variance in abatement costs, with some very low valueseven negative annual costs -and two very large positive values. Most projects were in the $100 -300 per ton range. It is notable that a substantial percentage of the total reduction to be gleaned from investments in 1994 -95 came at negative cost, indicating that efficiency improvements dominated investment decisions. 16 Survey of 750 firms titled "Waste Minimization and Resource Saving in Lithuanian Industry," conducted by Leonardas Rinkevièius. The surveys were hand-delivered and introduced to senior staff in each enterprise by trained enumerators and pickup times were arranged directly with these individuals. The enumerators returned to enterprises at appointed times, checked the surveys for completeness and contradictions, and recorded the names of enterprises and respondents before accepting survey forms. 17 Respondents did not differentiate different types of dust in their answers. In this survey respondents were strongly encouraged to include all possible steps taken that reduced emissions. Directions patterned on the US Pollution Abatement Cost and Expenditure (PACE) survey, as well as examples of such steps, were given to respondents. Figure 2 presents the net annualized costs of projects that reduced major criteria air pollutants such as sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, and all projects that were simply labeled in surveys as "air pollution" projects. In most cases these projects simultaneously reduced emissions of several pollutants and respondents typically could not provide any estimates of the emissions reductions (e.g. in tons). It is therefore not possible to use these data to directly estimate marginal or average costs. 
Project Number Thousands of 1995 Litas Per Year
Even with this important limitation, however, it is possible to say something about the likely costs of emissions reductions, because of the nineteen projects reported, fourteen of them had net yearly costs of less than 4000 litas, or $1000. Over half the projects were also either profitable or very nearly so, suggesting that many environment projects in Lithuania are business investments in disguise. Dust reduction projects yielded less striking results -probably because of the higher concentration of end-ofpipe measures -but still virtually 20% of the 59 projects reported were immediately profitable, and 61% had a net cost of less than $1000 per year.
To make a more substantive estimate of abatement costs, however, econometric analysis is required. The objective of the following exercise is therefore to a) estimate the demand for pollution directly using data generated by the pollution charge system and b) to estimate the effect on pollution emissions of a marginal increase in net annualized investment costs made in the past. The conceptual basis for part (a) relies on a standard, short-run representative firm optimization model adapted to the particulars of the Lithuanian case, including the reality that under and overcharging of firms occurs.
To motivate the structure of the empirical analysis, Equation 1 presents a highly simplified maximization problem of a representative firm that focuses exclusively on the environmental regulatory issues. Output (Q) in this problem is exogenous, as are output and input prices. There is one choice variable, emissions (E), which is a function of environmental investments made in the past (I) and the monitoring frequency of the regulator (M). Emissions are scaled by an exogenous facility standard (S). P 0 is the price of output (Q), and C i is a standard input cost function that depends on output (Q) and a vector of input prices (P i ). C E is the emissions charge function defined in the legislation, which depends on E/S, and the standard type (L). The firm also faces an exogenous excess charge rate (C x ), which it pays for each unit of E/S that it emits.
Equation 1
{ }
; ; / ( ) ; / Maximizing Equation 1 yields one first order condition for E/S. Moving C x to the RHS gives Equation 2. The LHS is negative and the RHS is positive, assuring an interior solution.
With an appropriate functional form for C E , 18 and noting that ∂π ∂ / CE = 1, it is possible to solve for an optimal level of E/S. In structural form, such a function is likely to look something like Equation 3, where the expectation is that { }
is the basic equation to be estimated in this paper, with the coefficient on C x representing the direct or short-run elasticity of demand for pollution. Given the special circumstances of the Lithuanian system, instead of asking the question "by how much do firms reduce emissions (or equivalently emissions divided by annual standards) when charge rates rise?" Equation 2 indicates that we must ask "how much do firms reduce emissions when they are overcharged by one unit?" Using the estimated elasticity, the short-run marginal cost of pollution reduction can then be calculated.
The estimated coefficient on the variable "I" can be thought of as the long-run elasticity of demand, because it tells us the marginal product of a unit of investment. From this information it is possible to back out abatement costs. A priori one might expect that long-run marginal costs will be greater than short-run costs.
The nature of the regulatory environment in Lithuania suggests that "E/S" is the appropriate measure of environmental performance. Because standards are set based on a variety of observable and unobservable firm-specific variables, using this variable also allows us to adjust for important crosssectional differences such as size, technology vintage, etc. that are not possible to adequately include as right-hand-side variables.
19 Adjusting for such factors was absolutely essential, because without this scaling it was impossible to explain even a fraction of the variation in emissions.
The functional form of the relationship between excess charges and the variable E/S is unknown. The form most consistent with theory is perhaps one in which as emissions fall demand becomes less
. Given the low average charge rates prevailing in Lithuania, however, it is possible that responsiveness is constant or increasing as rates rise. To allow for a variety of possibilities, squared and cubed excess charge rates were included as independent variables. Table 4 presents the variables used as left and right-hand variables in the regression equations. In addition to the excess charge rate variables, in the base regressions an attempt was made to adjust for the most important factors likely to affect E/S. Of perhaps most interest are proxies for the analytical model variable "I," in the econometric model defined as the net annual cost of criteria air and dust reduction projects (Netcostcrit and Netcostdust). The RHS of all equations estimated included variables in four areas: 1. The regulatory environment (e.g. annual facility standards, monitoring frequencies) 2. Activities undertaken by facilities to reduce emissions (e.g. Netcostcrit, Critair) 3. Basic firm information (e.g. output, percentage state ownership, employees, etc.) 4. Indications of firm innovativeness and environmental awareness (e.g. environmental staff, business plan with environmental component, plans for projects in future)
The function determining the excess charge rate firms pay is unknown. Indeed, it is possible that C x is only very loosely within the control of the enterprise (i.e. it is almost exogenous). To allow for cases where C x is both endogenous and exogenous, models were estimated by both OLS and 2SLS. Three stage least squares was not used, because of the substantial uncertainty regarding the determinants of C x . Because priors suggested the presence of heteroskedasticity in excess charge rates, standard error estimates were adjusted using the method of White (1980) .
To accomodate the use of 2SLS, additional instruments were included that could affect the degree of excess charges firms pay. These include variables that capture whether facilities are in large cities, how well connected are firms with other industrialists, the academic community and Ministry regional departments, and whether a facility is part of a known "clean" industry. 19 As discussed in Hettige et al (1994) , emissions per unit of output, per unit of revenue and per employee are other possible options. The formula for calculating Netcostcrit and Netcostdust was the sum for each project "i" implemented in 1993 or 1994. Projects completed before 1993 were omitted because of currency changes that occurred in 1993. Netcost i = I i *(r/(1-(1+r) -t )) + O -R. "I" is the level of investment made in period zero. "r" is the annual discount rate (assumed to be 12%). "t" is the lifetime of asset "I" (assumed to be 10 years). "O" is the operating cost of the asset and "R" are resources the firms saved by making the investment.
ADDITIONAL VARIABLES INCLUDED EXCLUSIVELY AS INSTRUMENTS FOR USE IN 2SLS REGRESSIONS
For three of the six pollutants analyzed, including in the sample those facilities with emissions greater than annual standards exerted an inordinately strong influence on the R 2 of equations. Indeed, in some cases the R 2 approached one. 21 In all cases very few facilities were over their standards, but omitting these observations nevertheless typically reduced the R 2 by half. Omitting these observations did not, however, in general substantially alter the coefficient estimates for the variables of interest and never caused signs to switch. To avoid the likelihood of problems, the analysis presented in the following section is therefore restricted only to facilities who had annual emissions less than or equal to annual standards. Table 5 presents the OLS and 2SLS regression results for each of the five pollutants analyzed. The table presents only the final regressions after variables were tested out of equations using standard T and F tests, combined with examinations of Durbin-Watson statistics to avoid the possibility of misspecifying regressions.
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RESULTS
In Table 5 we see that coefficients on excess charge rates always have the expected sign (negative) and are typically significant at the 99% level whether OLS or 2SLS was used. Coefficient estimates also do not differ dramatically depending on the estimation method used, though this claim certainly cannot be made with regard to the squared terms. Indeed, except in the case of manganese, when 2SLS was used, squared terms were either dropped from equations or their signs switched from negative to positive.
There were no priors on the coefficient estimates for Netcostcrit and Netcostdust, because the coefficient signs and magnitudes should depend on whether abatement costs are positive, negative or zero. That signs on both variable coefficients are negative and significant in all cases for all pollutants strongly suggests that zero-cost or "win-win" investments should not be considered typical in Lithuania. .16 E-02 (.10 E-02)
TABLE 5 OLS and 2SLS REGRESSION RESULTS
Dependent Variable "E/S" (Standard Errors in Parentheses)
.58 E-03 (.52 E-03)
. Table 6 presents estimates of marginal abatement costs based on elasticities of demand derived from the regression models. These simulations are for a representative firm that is average in all ways. Being "average" means that in the base case (i.e. with a 0% reduction in emissions from 1994 levels) the representative firms pays the mean charge rate per ton, has the mean level of "C x " and all other regression variables are also set equal to their means. Elasticity estimates derived from the demand functions were then applied to proportionate increases in actual charge rates paid. If we start the simulation from the base case as defined above, this means that the elasticity of demand associated with an initial 10% increase in "C x " is assumed to be the same as an initial 10% increase in the charge rate paid per ton. The same assumption is then made for the second 10% increase, the third 10% increase, etc. This link between excess charge rates and actual charge rates paid is necessary, because if our representative firm is a profit maximizer, in equilibrium marginal abatement costs will be set to equal actual charge rates paid. We therefore can estimate marginal abatement costs only with reference to actual charge rates paid. What we see in Table 6 are elasticities that are consistent with what one might expect given the low overall level of charge rates and charges paid in Lithuania. Elasticities are relatively low for small rate increases -typically in the -0.20 to -0.50 range -but they increase substantially as rates are allowed to rise above base levels. Elasticities are estimated to rise rather slowly, and to achieve, for example, a 25% reduction in emissions charge rates typically must at least be doubled. Again, because in equilibrium charge rates equal marginal abatement costs, for nitrogen dioxide we can conclude that a four to five-fold increase in marginal abatement costs occurs to achieve a 25% emissions reduction. Carbon monoxide costs on the other hand rise by only 50-60%.
Marginal abatement costs in this model are estimated to first rise rather quickly and then taper off as increasing reductions are demanded. Presumably this pattern is mainly a function of the existing low charge rates (and matching low level of marginal abatement costs), and as very large reductions (e.g. 85% or 95%) are demanded the marginal abatement cost functions would then move into steeply increasing ranges. In terms of marginal cost levels, other than comparison with engineering-based estimates that typically overstate costs, I am aware of no cases against which we can judge whether costs in Lithuania are low or high.
Perhaps the only reasonable estimates that can be used are average cost estimates from the US by Hartman et al (1994) for sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide and dust. Of course we can derive average costs from the series of marginal costs underlying Table 6 . Average costs associated with the last two columns of Table 6 are given in Table 7 . The 40% reduction level was chosen, because for most pollutants it is close to the maximum reduction that can reasonably be predicted without forecasting outside the sample of observed excess charge rates. This maximum is sought, because it is recognized that the US is much farther up its marginal abatement cost curve than Lithuania. Table 8 presents what we have been calling long-run average costs. These cost calculations are derived from the coefficients estimated for the variables Netcostcrit and Netcostdust. Comparing with Table 7 , except for sulfur dioxide and 2SLS long-run cost estimates for nitrogen dioxide, estimates in Table 8 are always greater. This pattern is consistent with the notion that Table 9 gives long-run costs. OLS estimates for sulfur dioxide are equivalent for the two methods. Table 7 estimates (with the exception of the OLS estimates for dust) with those of Hartman et al (1994) presented in Table 1 indicates that at least at the level of reduction considered, average and marginal costs are probably substantially lower in Lithuania than in the US. Indeed, average cost estimates are 25 -50% of US levels for sulfur dioxide and even lower for dust. Nitrogen dioxide average cost estimates are almost exactly the same as those derived by Hartman et al (1994) . I am not aware of any study that is a suitable basis for considering carbon monoxide or manganese reductions.
Instead comparing with Table 8 estimates, conclusions for sulfur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide are similar to those from Table 7 . Sulfur dioxide abatement costs are substantially lower in Lithuania. Nitrogen dioxide reduction costs are about the same as in the US. The conclusion for dust is not nearly as neat. The cost estimate from the OLS regression is virtually the same as that of Hartman et al (1994) . Two stage least squares estimates indicate costs twice that of the US.
Which project-based dust estimate is more likely to be correct? Referring back to Figure 1 where data on marginal costs are presented along with reported emissions reductions, if we omit the top three and bottom two observations and take an average, we get $143, which is between the OLS and 2SLS values in Table 8 . Perhaps this is as good an estimate as we can get for what an average annual cost of a dust reduction project might be.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this paper was propose air pollution abatement cost estimates based on observed behavior in a transition country. The paper partially fills an important policy research gap, because for at least two reasons -calculation of pollution charge rates and determining a baseline cost estimate for those countries approximating their legislation with the European Union -such estimates are absolutely necessary for informed policy making. Nevertheless, cost estimates are non-existent in CEE and FSU. A rather thorough combing of the literature indeed reveals that relatively few estimates based on observed behavior are available for any region of the world.
The major result of the paper is that the costs of reducing sulfur dioxide, and perhaps also dust, are likely to be substantially lower in transition countries than in the west. This supports the conventional wisdom. Stationary source nitrogen dioxide abatement, on the other hand, costs about the same as in the US. No comparisons were possible for carbon monoxide or manganese.
It was also found that in the Lithuanian case elasticities of demand for pollution are low, but are by no means zero. They also increase substantially as greater reductions in emissions are sought. These findings are particularly useful for proponents of pollution charges, because it means that reasonable increases in the existing (low) level of charge rates can potentially have large effects. For example, in 1995 dollars, an $80.00 per ton charge on SO 2 will probably reduce emissions by an average of 25% -30% from 1994 emissions levels. A charge on carbon monoxide of $1.25 per ton could yield a similar level of reduction.
The results on projects implemented suggest that even in the depths of the economic contraction in Lithuania in 1993 and 1994, environmental projects that were largely production modification investments were being undertaken. So-called "win-win" projects indeed do appear to have been the focus at least when considering air protection. Because many of these projects also had such low net annualized costs, these results strongly call into question the claim that existing levels of charges are ineffective incentives for making investments. Indeed, if many projects are undertaken at zero or negative annual cost, substantial reductions are being induced by charges.
In terms of further work, it seems likely that in other CEE and FSU countries similar analyses could be undertaken, because the regulatory systems are similar. In Lithuania, data on water pollution are also available and analysis of these data could potentially yield some interesting insights. An important methodological extension is to endogenize the level of environmental investments, but this requires an analytical model that is dynamic and the development of a panel of data for years subsequent to 1994. These extensions are left for future research.
